

# Comparative Political Institutions Political Science 7172

University of Colorado, Boulder

Professor Sarah Wilson Sokhey

Fall 2019, Mondays, Ketchum 1B-31, 2-4:30pm

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## Course Description

This course introduces students to academic research in comparative political institutions. We address a wide variety of topics including what it means to study comparative political institutions, regime type, authoritarian institutions, electoral politics, parliamentary and presidential systems, institutions and ethnic politics, and much more. This course is primarily designed to train political science Ph.D. students, although it may be of interest to students in other disciplines.

## Course Requirements

Students are required to read all material before class and come prepared to discuss the material critically. This class is intended to help prepare political science graduate students for their comprehensive exams and to be prepared to conduct their own research including a dissertation project. The reading load is designed to meet these goals.

Your grade will be based on the following components:

- Research Paper 40%
- Participation 30% total (see breakdown below)
- 6 weekly reaction papers 30% total (each worth 5%)

### Research Paper (worth 40% grade)

You are required to write a research paper. In most cases, your paper should include an empirical component, but I am open to suggestions about research design or theoretical papers. Please talk to me first if you will not be including an empirical component to your paper to make sure it fits well with the class. There is no required length, but research papers are often in the 20-30 page range.

### Participation (worth 30% grade total)

Participation includes:

1. **Class Discussions (10%):** You should be actively asking and answering questions about the readings every week. As always, be polite and respectful of your fellow students.
2. **Discussion Leaders (5%):** As part of the class discussions, each student will be required to choose a week for which they will be responsible for starting off the discussion for the readings by offering several discussion questions. This is not a presentation of the readings, but rather an opportunity for you to frame the discussion and pose interesting questions to your classmates. NOTE: On the day you are the lead discussant, you are required to prepare notes and questions to provide to your classmates in advance which I will share with your classmates at least 24 hours before class time. You will be asked to sign up for a week to be discussion leader in class.

3. **Abstract (5%):** I will ask you to submit an abstract for your research paper in week 4 of the course. This is not binding and you can change your topic at any time, but I want to encourage you to start thinking and working on the paper sooner than later.
4. **Presenting & Discussion Research (10%):** The final two weeks of class are very important because they are devoted to presenting and discussing your research papers which are due at the beginning of fall break. You will be designed as a discussant to focus on one other student's paper. For the paper for which you are the assigned discussant, you should prepare a written memo highlighting the strengths of the paper and areas for improvement. (As always, be polite and constructive.) You should read all of your fellow students' papers before they present.

### **6 Weekly Reaction Papers (worth 30% grade; each paper is worth 5%)**

You are required to write 6 reaction papers based on the readings. The reaction papers should be about 2 pages, double-spaced, 11 or 12 point font. You should briefly summarize the most important points in the readings and identify interesting questions and/or critiques of the materials. You should aim to make an argument in your reaction paper. You can choose any week to write a reaction paper in which reading has been assigned. You are responsible for making sure you complete 6 reaction papers by the end of the semester. We have 11 weeks of reading material (excluding the first week) giving you ample choice of weeks for which to write a reaction paper. You should upload your reaction paper on our course website (<https://canvas.colorado.edu>) before class that week.

NOTE: You may submit up to 2 extra reaction papers to replace 2 grades on previous reaction papers.

### **Books Recommended (Not Required) for Purchase**

The following texts are recommended for purchase because we read portions of the book for class and because I think they are worth owning. On the syllabus, I list the chapters on which you should focus your reading and these chapters will be scanned and posted on our Canvas course website. I would urge you to consider buying at least some of these. I will also try to put these books on reserve at Norlin Library.

- Jose Cheibub. 2007. *Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN-13: 9780521542449
- Anthony Downs. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. London: Harper and Row. (We do not read this book for class. Instead, we read an article by Downs that summarizes the main arguments. This is, however, a very classic work and you should consider buying it.)
- Jennifer Gandhi 2010. *Political Institutions under Dictatorship*. Cambridge University Press.
- Susan Hyde. 2011. *The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma: Why Election Observers Became an International Norm*. Cornell University Press.
- Joseph Jupille, Walter Mattlie, and Dunacan Snidal. 2013. *Institutional Choice and Global Commerce*. Cambridge University Press.
- Orit Kedar. 2009. *Voting for Policy, Not Parties: How Voters Compensate for Power Sharing*. Cambridge University Press.
- Amy Liu. 2015. *Standardizing Diversity: The Political Economy of Language Rights*. University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey. 1992. *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*. Cambridge University Press. (We do not read this book for class, but it is an important work that you might consider buying if it relates to research you will do.)
- Kathleen Thelen. 2004. *How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the United States and Japan*. Cambridge University Press.
- Lily Tsai. 2007. *Accountability without Democracy: Solidary Group and Public Goods Provision in Rural China*. Cambridge University Press.

- George Tsebelis. 2002. *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. (We read 2 articles by Tsebelis, but we do not read this book for class. If you are interested in this kind of institutional work, you should consider buying this.)

**Accommodations for Disabilities:** If you qualify for accommodations because of a disability, please submit your accommodation letter from Disability Services to your faculty member in a timely manner so that your needs can be addressed. Disability Services determines accommodations based on documented disabilities in the academic environment. Information on requesting accommodations is located on the [Disability Services website](#). Contact Disability Services at 303-492-8671 or [dsinfo@colorado.edu](mailto:dsinfo@colorado.edu) for further assistance. If you have a temporary medical condition or injury, see [Temporary Medical Conditions](#) under the Students tab on the Disability Services website.

**Classroom Behavior:** Students and faculty each have responsibility for maintaining an appropriate learning environment. Those who fail to adhere to such behavioral standards may be subject to discipline. Professional courtesy and sensitivity are especially important with respect to individuals and topics dealing with race, color, national origin, sex, pregnancy, age, disability, creed, religion, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, veteran status, political affiliation or political philosophy.

**Honor Code:** All students enrolled in a University of Colorado Boulder course are responsible for knowing and adhering to the Honor Code. Violations of the policy may include: plagiarism, cheating, fabrication, lying, bribery, threat, unauthorized access to academic materials, clicker fraud, submitting the same or similar work in more than one course without permission from all course instructors involved, and aiding academic dishonesty. All incidents of academic misconduct will be reported to the Honor Code ([honor@colorado.edu](mailto:honor@colorado.edu)); 303-492-5550). Students who are found responsible for violating the academic integrity policy will be subject to nonacademic sanctions from the Honor Code as well as academic sanctions from the faculty member. Additional information regarding the Honor Code academic integrity policy can be found at the [Honor Code Office website](#).

**Plagiarism:** Don't do it. If I find you have plagiarized, you will fail the course and I will follow University procedures to pursue academic sanctions. At the graduate level, the reputational costs of plagiarizing are very high; it's not worth it. More generally, you should take seriously the task of correctly citing works you have referenced. If you have any questions about what constitute plagiarism or proper citation, please ask.

**Sexual Misconduct, Discrimination, Harassment and/or Related Retaliation:** The University of Colorado Boulder (CU Boulder) is committed to fostering a positive and welcoming learning, working, and living environment. CU Boulder will not tolerate acts of sexual misconduct (including sexual assault, exploitation, harassment, dating or domestic violence, and stalking), discrimination, and harassment by members of our community. Individuals who believe they have been subject to misconduct or retaliatory actions for reporting a concern should contact the Office of Institutional Equity and Compliance (OIEC) at 303-492-2127 or [cureport@colorado.edu](mailto:cureport@colorado.edu). Information about the OIEC, university policies, [anonymous reporting](#), and the campus resources can be found on the [OIEC website](#).

Please know that faculty and instructors have a responsibility to inform OIEC when made aware of incidents of sexual misconduct, discrimination, harassment and/or related retaliation, to ensure that individuals impacted receive information about options for reporting and support resources.

**Religious Holidays:** Campus policy regarding religious observances requires that faculty make every effort to deal reasonably and fairly with all students who, because of religious obligations, have conflicts with scheduled exams, assignments or required attendance.

**Campus Resources:** The University of Colorado has a wide variety of resources to help you with a range of situations, challenges, and problems you may encounter. You should be aware of these and take full

advantage of the following resources for yourself. You may also want to keep these in mind if you are concerned about an undergraduate student (regardless of whether they are in a class you are teaching or grading for) or if you are concerned about another graduate student. You should always feel free to let me know about any concerns or assistance you are looking for during the semester.

- **Resources for Graduate Students:** <https://www.colorado.edu/gtp/resources/resources-graduate-students>
- **Campus Resources:** <https://www.colorado.edu/graduateschool/current-students/campus-resources>
- **Student Support and Case Management:** <https://www.colorado.edu/studentaffairs/students-concern/student-support-and-case-management>
- **Counseling and Psychiatric Services:** <https://www.colorado.edu/counseling/>
- **Office of Victim Assistance:** <https://www.colorado.edu/ova/>
- **Student Conduct & Conflict Resolution:** <https://www.colorado.edu/sccr/>
- **Medical Services:** <https://www.colorado.edu/healthcenter/>
- **CU Boulder Police:** <https://www.colorado.edu/police/>
- **Responding to students in distress:** <https://www.colorado.edu/redfolder/>

**Names & Pronouns:** Professional courtesy and sensitivity are especially important with respect to individuals and topics dealing with differences of race, culture, religion, politics, sexual orientation, gender, gender variance, and nationalities. Class rosters are provided to the instructor with the student's legal name. I will gladly honor your request to address you by an alternate name or gender pronoun. Please advise me of this preference early in the semester so that I may make appropriate changes to my records. See policies at [colorado.edu/policies/classbehavior.html](https://www.colorado.edu/policies/classbehavior.html) and at [colorado.edu/studentaffairs/judicialaffairs/code.html#student\\_code](https://www.colorado.edu/studentaffairs/judicialaffairs/code.html#student_code).

**A Note on the Design of the Syllabus:** There are a lot of considerations that go into the design of a syllabus for a graduate level seminar in the social sciences. My criteria for selecting topics and readings are to:

- Cover important material in the discipline to help you prepare for comprehensive exams and prepare you to conduct your own research
- Choose things that are interesting to discuss
- Include classic, big works
- Include recent, innovative works
- Avoid duplicating material (too much) from other seminars students are likely to take
- Include traditionally underrepresented groups of authors including people of color and women
- Include relevant research from faculty in our own department

My syllabi are constantly evolving in order to fulfill these criteria and balance these different—and sometimes competing—goals. Suggestions are welcome!

## Course Plan

The required readings will be posted on our course website on Canvas (<https://canvas.colorado.edu>) except for the books listed for purchase. I will try to put the books suggested for purchase on reserve at Norlin Library. Recommended readings are optional and are included to give you a fuller idea of the literature on the topic. Recommended readings may also be useful for your research papers.

The course is organized around the following topics:

- Topic 1: Intro to Studying Comparative Political Institutions
- Topic 2: Regime Type & Authoritarian Institutions
- Topic 3: Democratic Institutions
- Topic 4: Institutional Effects (on things like ethnic politics, policy outcomes, trust, etc.)
- Topic 5: How to Think About, Study & Measure Institutions
- Topic 6: Current Innovative Research (That's You!)

### Topic 1: Introduction to Studying Comparative Political Institutions

#### Week 1 (August 26): Studying Comparative Political Institutions

Required:

*Recent academically informed commentary on comparative political institutions*

- Alla Baronovsky-Dewey, "Why Russia's Garbage Protests Turned Violent: The bigger stink may be corruption, not trash," *Washington Post*, Monkey Cage blog, August 19, 2019.
- Jesse Marks, "Humanitarian aid in Syria is being politicized—and too many civilians in need aren't getting it; when the government controls the aid, it gets used for political gain," *Washington Post*, Monkey Cage blog, August 6, 2019.
- Laura Seay, "Strong NGOs and Weak States' takes an intriguing look at the path of justice in Congo and South Africa; NGOs may wield more power than you think," *Washington Post*, Monkey Cage blog, August 16, 2019.

*Classic Works*

- Gabriel Almond. 1955. "Comparative Political Systems," Paper prepared for the Conference on the Comparative method in The Study of Politics, Social Science Research Council, Princeton University, June 2-4.
- Kathleen Thelen. 2009. "Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies," *British Journal of International Relations*, 47:3 (September).

Recommended:

- Robert Dahl. 1961. "The Behavioral Approach in Political Science: Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest," *American Political Science Review*, Vo. 55, No.4 (Dec.), pp. 763-772. (This is fun to read and also a good look at how people used to think about the discipline of political science. It used to be that everything we studied was political institutions.)
- Peter Hall. 1997. "The Role of Interests, Institutions, and Ideas in the Comparative Political Economy of Industrialized Nations," in *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture and Structure*, Mark Irving Luchbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, eds. Cambridge University Press.
- Paul Pierson. 2004. *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Political Analysis*. Princeton University Press.
- Kathleen Thelen. 2004. *How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the United States and Japan*. Cambridge University Press.

#### Week 2 (September 2) – No Class (Labor Day holiday)

## Topic 2: Regime Type & Authoritarian Institutions

### Week 3 (September 9) – Regime Type as an Institution

Discussion Leader(s): \_\_\_\_\_

Required:

- José Antonio Cheibub, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Raymond Vreeland. 2010. “Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited.” *Public Choice* 143: 67-101.
- Larry Diamond. 2002. “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes.” *Journal of Democracy* 13: 21-35.
- Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. 2014. “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Dataset.” *Perspectives on Politics* 12: 313-331.
- Susan Hyde and Elizabeth Saunders. 2019. “Recapturing Regime Type in International Relations: Leaders, Institutions, and Agency Space,” Forthcoming in *International Organization*.
- Jessica Weeks. 2012. “Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 106, Issue 2 (May): 326-347.

Recommended:

- Alexandre Debs and H.E. Goemans. 2010. “Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War,” *American Political Science Review*, 104: 430-45.
- Jacob Gerner Hariri. 2012. “The Autocratic Legacy of Early Statehood,” *American Political Science Review* 106, 3 (August): 471-494;
- Lisa Blaydes and Eric Chaney. 2013. The Feudal Revolution and Europe's Rise: Political Divergence of the Christian West and the Muslim World before 1500 CE. *American Political Science Review* 107, 1 (February): 16-34.
- Levitsky, Steven & Lucan A. Way. 2002. “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism.” *Journal of Democracy* 13: 51-65.

### Week 4 (September 16) – Institutions in Authoritarian Regimes

Discussion Leader(s): \_\_\_\_\_

DUE: Submit a proposed abstract for your research paper on our Canvas course website before class time on Monday, September 16 at 2pm.

Required:

- Jennifer Gandhi 2010. *Political Institutions under Dictatorship*. Cambridge University Press; read chapters 1, 4, 6, and 7.
- Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski. 2006. “Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion Under Dictatorships.” *Economics and Politics* 18: 1-26.
- Melanie Manion. 2015. *Information for Autocrats: Representation in Chinese Local Congresses*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Read Introduction, Chapter 1 (Institutional Design), Chapter 2 (Selectorial Connection), and Conclusion chapter.
- Lily Tsai. 2007. *Accountability without Democracy: Solidary Groups and Public Goods Provision in Rural China*. Cambridge University Press; read chapters 1, 4, and 9.

Recommended:

- Dawn Brancati. 2014. Democratic Authoritarianism: Origins and Effects. *Annual Review of Political Science* 17: 313-326.

- Jennifer Gandhi and Ellen Lust-Okar. 2009. Elections under Authoritarianism. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 12:403-422.
- Edmund Malesky and Paul Schuler. 2010. "Nodding or Needling: Analyzing Delegate Responsiveness in an Authoritarian Parliament," *American Political Science Review*, 104: 482-502.
- Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way. 2010. *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Rachel Beatty Riedl. 2014. *Authoritarian Origins of Democratic Party Systems in Africa*. Cambridge University Press.
- Jessica Weeks. 2008. "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve," *International Organization*, 62: 35-64.

## Week 5 (September 23) – Elections & Electoral Problems

Discussion Leader(s): \_\_\_\_\_

Required:

- Emilie Hafner-Burton, Susan Hyde and Ryan Joblonski. 2014. "When Do Governments Resort to Election Violence?" *British Journal of Political Science*, 44(1): 149-179.
- Emilie Hafner-Burton, Susan Hyde, and Ryan Jablonski. 2018. "Surviving Elections: Election Violence, Incumbent Victory and Post-Election Repurcussions," *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 48, Issue 2 (April).
- Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik. 2010. "Defeating Dictators: Electoral Change and Stability in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes," *World Politics*, Vol. 62, Issue 1 (January).
- Susan Hyde. 2011. *The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma: Why Election Observers Became an International Norm*. Cornell University Press; read chapters 1, 4, 5, and conclusion.

Recommended:

- Scott Gehlbach and Alberto Simpsper: 2014. "Electoral Manipulation as Bureaucratic Control." *American Journal of Political Science*.
- Emily Beaulieu. 2014. *Electoral Protest and Democratization in the Developing World*. Cambridge University Press.
- Emily Beaulieu and Susan D. Hyde. 2009. "In the Shadow of Democracy Promotion: Strategic Manipulation, International Observers, and Election Boycotts." *Comparative Political Studies*, 42: 392-415.
- Beatriz Magaloni. 2006. *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico*. Cambridge University Press.
- Lisa Blaydes. 2011. *Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt*. New York; Cambridge University Press.
- Dawn Brancati and Jack Snyder. 2012. "Time to Kill: The Impact of Election Timing on Post-Conflict Stability," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 57:822-853.
- Andreas Schedler. 2002. "The Menu of Manipulation," *Journal of Democracy*, 13(2): 36-50.
- Andreas Schedler, 2002. "The Nested Fame of Democratization by Elections," *International Political Science Review*, 23(1): 103-122.
- Andreas Schedler, ed. 2006. *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Alberto Simpsper. 2012: *Why Parties and Governments Manipulate Elections: Theory, Practice, and Implications*. Cambridge University Press.
- Susan Stokes. 2005. "Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine politics with Evidence from Argentina," *American Political Science Review*, 99(3):315-325.

- Joshua Tucker. 2007. "Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-Communist Colored Revolutions," *Perspectives on Politics*, 5(3):535-551.

<b>Topic 3: Democratic Institutions</b>
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### Week 6 (September 30) – Parliamentary, Presidential, and Semi-Presidential Regimes

Discussion Leader(s): \_\_\_\_\_

**Required:**

- José Cheibub. 2006. *Presidentialism, Parliamentarism and Democracy*. Cambridge University Press; read chapters 1, 2, 6, and conclusion.
- Sona Golder. 2006. "Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation in Parliamentary Democracies," *British Journal of Political Science*, 36: 193-212.
- George Tsebelis. 1995. 'Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, and Multipartyism.' *British Journal of Political Science*.
- Tsebelis, George. 1999. "Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis." *American Political Science Review*, 93: 591-608.
- Margit Tavits. 2009. *Presidents with Prime Ministers*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; read Chapters 1, 3, and 7

**Recommended (including some readings on government formation):**

- Cheibub, José Antonio, Zachary Elkins, & Tom Ginsburg. 2013. "Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism." *British Journal of Political Science* 44: 515-544.
- Elgie, Robert. 2011. *Semi-Presidentialism: Sub-Types and Democratic Performance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Linz, Juan. 1990. The Perils of Presidentialism. *Journal of Democracy* 1: 51-69;
- Shugart, Matthew Soberg, and John M. Carey. 1992. *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Tavits, Margit. 2009. *Presidents with Prime Ministers*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Tsebelis, George. 2002. *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Golder, Matt, Sona Golder, & David Siegel. 2012. "Modeling the Institutional Foundations of Parliamentary Government Formation." *Journal of Politics* 74: 427-445.1
- Golder, Sona & Margaret H. Arriotti. Forthcoming. "Partisan Portfolio Allocation in African Democracies." *Comparative Political Studies*.
- Kellam, Marisa. 2015. "Parties for Hire: How Particularistic Parties Influence Presidents' Governing Strategies." *Party Politics* 21: 515-526.
- Folke, Olle and Johanna Rickne. 2016. "The Glass Ceiling in Politics: Formalization and Empirical Tests." *Comparative Political Studies* 49(5): 567-599.
- O'Brien, Diana Z. 2015. "Rising to the Top: Gender, Political Performance, and Party Leadership in Advanced Industrial Democracies." *American Journal of Political Science* 59(4): 1022-1039.

## Week 7 (October 7) – Electoral Politics & Party Systems

Discussion Leader(s): \_\_\_\_\_

Required:

### *The Classics*

- Anthony Downs. 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 65, No. 2 (April), pp. 135-150.
- On Duverger, read: Joseph A. Schlesinger and Mildred S. Schlesinger. 2006. "Maurice Duverger and the Study of Political Parties," *French Politics*, Vol. 4: 58-68.

### *Newer Work*

- Andrea Aldrich. 2018. "Party organization and gender in European elections," *Party Politics*.
- Pradeep Chhibber and Ken Kollman. 1998. "Party Aggregation and the Number of Parties in India and the United States." *American Political Science Review*, 92: 329-342.
- Orit Kedar. 2009. *Voting for Policy, Not Parties: How Voters Compensate for Power Sharing*. New York: Cambridge University Press; Focus on chapters 1, 2, and 6.
- See also: Patrick Dunleavy, 2012, "Duverger's Law is a dead parrot. European political scientists need to recognize that plurality or majority voting has no tendency at all to produce two party politics," London School of Economics (LSE) blog, <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/euoppblog/2012/06/20/duvergers-law-is-dead/>

Recommended:

- Joel Barkan, Paul J. Densham, & Gerard Rushton. 2006. "Space Matters: Designing Better Electoral Systems for Emerging Democracies." *American Journal of Political Science* 50: 926-939.
- Tiffany D. Barnes and Mirya R. Holman. Forthcoming (in 2019). "Gender Quotas, Women's Representation, and Legislative Diversity," *Journal of Politics*.
- Benoit, Kenneth. 2000. "Which Electoral Formula is the Most Proportional? A New Look with New Evidence." *Political Analysis* 8: 381-388.
- Benoit, Kenneth. 2002. "The Endogeneity Problem in Electoral Studies: A Critical Re-Examination of Duverger's Mechanical Effect." *Electoral Studies* 21: 35-46.
- Bunce & Wolchik book, *Competitive Authoritarian Elections*
- William Clark and Matt Golder. 2006. "Rehabilitating Duverger's Theory: Testing the Mechanical and Strategic Modifying Effects of Electoral Laws." *Comparative Political Studies* 39: 679-708.
- W. M. Dobell. 1986. "Updating Duverger's Law," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vo. 19, No. 3 (Sep.), pp. 585-595.
- Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. London: Harper and Row.
- Duverger, Maurice. [1954] 1963. *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (This is a foundational work that you should absolutely know about.)
- Lijphart, Arend. 1994. *Electoral Systems and Party Systems*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kollman, Ken, John Miller & Scott E. Page. 1998. "Political Parties and Electoral Landscapes." *British Journal of Political Science* 28: 139-158.
- Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan. 1990. "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments." In Peter Mair (ed.) *The West European Party System*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Riker, William H. 1982. "The Two-Party System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science." *American Political Science Review* 76: 753-766.

- Shugart, Matthew Soberg & Martin P. Wattenberg. 2001. *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Stoll, Heather. 2013. *Changing Societies, Changing Party Systems*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Stoll, Heather. 2015. "Presidential Coattails: A Closer Look." *Party Politics* 21: 417-427.
- Taagepera, Rein & Matthew Shugart. 1989. *Seats and Votes*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Jason Wittenberg. 2006. *Crucibles and Political Loyalty: Church Institutions and Electoral Continuity in Hungary*. Cambridge University Press.

<b>Topic 4: Institutional Effects</b>
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### Week 8 (October 14) – Institutions & Ethnic Politics

Discussion Leader(s): \_\_\_\_\_

Required:

- Donald Horowitz. 1993. "Democracy in Divided Societies," *Journal of Democracy* 4, 4 (October): 18-38.
- Arend Lijphart. 2004. "Constitutional Design for Divided Societies," *Journal of Democracy* 15: 96-109;
- Amy Liu. 2015. *Standardizing Diversity: The Political Economy of Language Rights*. University of Pennsylvania Press; read chapters 1, 3, and 4.
- Joel Selway and Kharis Templeman. 2012. "The Myth of Consociationalism? Conflict Reduction in Divided Societies," *Comparative Political Studies* 45 (December): 1542-1571;
- Benjamin Graham, Michael K. Miller and Kaare Strøm. 2017. "Safeguarding Democracy: Powersharing and Democratic Survival," *American Political Science Review* 111, 4 (November): 686-704.

Recommended:

- Michael Ferguson. 2012. *Sharing Democracy*. Oxford University Press.
- Dino Hadzic, David Carlson, and Margit Tavits. 2017. "The Effect of Exposure to Violence on Ethnic Voting." *British Journal of Political Science*.
- Arend Lijphart. 1996. The puzzle of Indian democracy: A consociational interpretation. *American Political Science Review* 90, 2 (June): 258-268;
- Rudy B. Andeweg. 2000. Consociational Democracy. *Annual Review of Political Science* 3: 509-536;
- Benjamin Reilly. 2002. Electoral Systems for Divided Societies. *Journal of Democracy* 13 (2): 156-170;
- Zachary Elkins and John Sides. 2007. Can Institutions Build Unity in Multiethnic States? *American Political Science Review* 101 (4): 693-708.

## Week 9 (October 21) – Institutions & Policy Outcomes

Discussion Leader(s): \_\_\_\_\_

Required:

- Kendall D. Funk and Andrew Q. Philips. 2019. “Representative Budgeting: Women Mayors and the Composition of Spending in Local Governments,” *Political Research Quarterly*, Vol. 72(1), pp. 19-33.
- Ato Kwamena Onoma. 2010. “The Contradictory Potential of Institutions: The Rise and Decline of Land Documentation in Kenya,” in *Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power*. Cambridge University Press, eds. James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen.
- Sibel Otkay. 2018. “Chamber of opportunities: Legislative politics and coalition security policy,” *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, Vol. 20(1).
- Sarah Wilson Sokhey. 2017. *The Political Economy of Pension Policy Reversal in Post-Communist Countries* (aka, PEPPER-Comm). Cambridge University Press. Read chapters 3 and 4, and the overview & summary of the case study findings.

Recommended:

- Hilary Appel. 2011. *Tax Politics in Eastern Europe: Globalization, Regional Integration, and the Democratic Compromise*. University of Michigan Press.
- Scott Gehlbach. 2008. *Representation through Taxation: Revenue, Politics, and Development*. Cambridge University Press; Read chapters 3, 4, and 6
- Jacob Hacker. 2006. *The Great Risk Shift: The New Economic Insecurity and the Decline of the American Dream*. Oxford University Press.
- Andrew Macintyre, *The Power of Institutions: Political Architecture and Governance*, Cornell University Press, 2003.
- Clara Park, “Financial Connectedness and Restrictive Liberalization,” working paper from September 26, 2018.
- Eric Patashnik, *Reforms at Risk: What Happens After Major Changes Are Enacted*. Princeton University Press.
- Democracy & Economic Reform
  - Adam Przeworski. 1990. *Democracy and the Market*. Cambridge University Press.
  - Joel Hellman. 1998. “Winner’s Take All,” *World Politics*.
  - Timothy Frye. 2010. *Building States and Markets After Communism: The Perils of Polarized Democracy*. Cambridge University Press.

## Week 10 (October 28) – Institutions & Attitudes, and Informal Institutions

Discussion Leader(s): \_\_\_\_\_

Required:

- Anna Gryzmala-Busse. 2010. “The Best Laid Plans: The Impact of Informal Rules on Formal Institutions in Transitional Regimes,” *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 45:311-333.
- Markus Freitag and Marc Bühlman. 2009. “Crafting Trust: The Role of Political Institutions in a Comparative Perspective,” *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 12 (December): 1537-1566.
- Fred Pampel, Giulia Andrighetto, and Sven Steinmo. 2018. “How Institutions and Attitudes Shape Tax Compliance: a Cross-National Experiment and Survey,” *Social Forces*, 97(3).
- Israel Marques II and Sarah Wilson Sokhey, “Bad Institutions and Preferences for Redistribution” working paper.

Recommended:

- David Bruner, John D'Attoma, and Sven Steinmo. 2017. "The role of gender in the provision of public goods through tax compliance," *Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics*, 71: 45-55.
- Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky. 2004. "Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda," *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (December). (This is an excellent review article.)
- Tamar Malloy, *Respectable Prejudices: Discrimination through Disciplinary Respectability*, book manuscript.
- Douglas North. 1991. "Institutions," *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 5, No. 1(Winter): 97-112.
- Douglas North, 1990, *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance*, Cambridge University Press.
- Robert Putnam. 1993. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. (If you haven't read this in another class, you should read it. It's a classic and foundational work.)
- Sven Steinmo, chapter "Trustworthy Institutions: A Cognitive Theory of Tax Morale"

<b>Topic 5: How to Think About, Study, and Measure Institutions</b>
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**Week 11 (November 4) – Institutional Origins**

Discussion Leader(s): \_\_\_\_\_

Required:

- Elinor Ostrom and Xavier Basurto. 2011. "Crafting analytical tools to study institutional change," *Journal of Institutional Economics*, 7(3): 317-343.
- Paul Pierson. 2004. *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis*. Princeton University Press, read Chapters 4 and 5 and the conclusion.
- Joseph Jupille, Walter Mattlie, and Dunacan Snidal. 2013. *Institutional Choice and Global Commerce*. Cambridge University Press; read Part I and Part III (which means chapters 1, 2, 3, and 7)
- Orion Lewis and Sven Steinmo. 2012. "How Institutions Evolve: Evolutionary Theory and Institutional Change," *Polity*, Vol. 4, No. 3 (July 3).

Recommended:

- Scott Abramson. 2017. The Economic Origins of the Territorial State. *International Organization* 71 (Winter): 97-130;
- Lisa Blaydes and Eric Chaney. 2013. The Feudal Revolution and Europe's Rise: Political Divergence of the Christian West and the Muslim World before 1500 CE. *American Political Science Review* 107, 1 (February): 16-34.
- Mark Blyth, Geoffrey Hodgson, Orion Lewis, and Sven Steinmo. 2011. "Introduction to the Special Issue on the Evolution of Institutions," *Journal of Institutional Economics*, 7(3): 299-315.

## Week 12 (November 11) – Institutions: Inference & Analysis

Discussion Leader(s): \_\_\_\_\_

Required:

- Avner Grief and David Laitin. 2004. “A theory of endogenous institutional change,” *American Political Science Review*, 98(4): 633-52.
- Timothy Frye. 2012. “In From the Cold: Institutions and Causal Inference in Postcommunist Studies,” *Annual Review of Political Science*, 15: 245-63.
- Adam Przeworski. 2004. Institutions Matter? *Government and Opposition* 39, 4 (September): 527-540.
- Kathleen Thelen. 2004. *How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the United States and Japan*. Cambridge University Press, Read chapters 2 and 6

Recommended:

- James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, eds. 2010. *Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power*. Cambridge University Press.
- Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen, eds. 2005. *Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies*. Oxford University Press.
- Kathleen Thelen. 1999. “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 2, pp.369-404.

## Week 13 (November 18) –Institutional Data

Discussion Leader(s): \_\_\_\_\_

Required:

- Matthijs Bogaards. 2007. “Measuring Democracy through Election Outcomes: A Critique with African Data,” *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 10 (October): 1211-1237.
- Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, Tobias Lenz, Jeanine Bezujin, Besir Ceka, and Svet Derderyan. 2017. *Measuring International Authority: A Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance*, Volume III, Oxford University Press.
- Marcus Kurtz and Andrew Schrank. 2007. “Growth and Governance: Models, Measures, and Mechanisms,” *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 69, No. 2 (May), pp. 538-554. (Takeaway: The Quality of Governance Indicators from the World Bank are no good; don't use them.)

Recommended:

- Thorsten Beck, George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer, and Patrick Walsh. 2001. “New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Indicators,” *The World Bank Economic Review*, Vo. 15, No. 1, pp. 165-176.
- Carles Boix, Michael Miller, and Sebastien Rosato. 2012. “A Complete Data Set of Political Times, 1800-2007,” *Comparative Political Studies*, 46(12): 1523-1554.
- Aljaž Kunčič. 2014. “Institutional quality dataset,” *Journal of Institutional Economics*, 10:1, 135-161.
- Friedrich Schneider, Andreas Buehn, and Claudio Montenegro. 2010. New Estimates for the Shadow Economies All Over the World. *International Economic Journal*, 24(4): 443-461.

## Week 14 (Fall Break, November 25-29)

## Topic 6: Discussing Current Innovative Research (That's You!)

### Week 15 (December 2) - Discussion of Research Papers

Notes about the research paper

- **Papers are due on Monday, November 25<sup>th</sup> by 5pm.** This deadline is to allow your classmates time (at least a week) to read your paper before class, so please do submit your paper in a timely manner. **There is a penalty of 10 points a day for every day your paper is late.** Your paper will be made available to all of your classmates. You are expected to have looked at all of your classmates' papers prior to the presentations during the final weeks of class. Your comments during the discussion should focus on constructive suggestions.
- Please upload your paper on our course website available through <https://canvas.colorado.edu>.
- You will be assigned discussant responsibilities for one other specific paper in class. As the assigned discussant, you should treat your responsibilities like you would if you were discussing a paper at a professional conference: briefly summarize the paper's main findings, highlight the paper's strong points, and make constructive comments for improvement. You should prepare a one-page memo with your comments to share with your classmate as part of your discussant responsibilities. As always, please be polite and constructive.
- Your presentation & discussant responsibilities are part of your participation grade for the course.
- You will be assigned a specific day for your presentation in class.
- A schedule of who is presenting when and assigned discussant duties will be posted on Canvas.

### Week 16 (December 9) - Discussion of Research Papers